Wake up call on Defence

 

Anurag Viswanath: Clouds of history

Anurag Viswanath / New Delhi January 17, 2008

 

Apart from the border dispute, China's encirclement of India remains a serious cause for concern.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s maiden visit to China with an “open mind” concluded on a high note with the joint declaration on “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century”, a commitment to building a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity through developing the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership. The declaration supports China’s commitment to support India’s aspirations in United Nations, cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, besides positively viewing India’s participation in regional and sub-regional multilateral process and furthering bilateral trade.

Clichés aside, the visit was symbolic — issues such as the border dispute will fester in the background. The PM’s visit to China provides not only an opportunity to deepen a win-win economic relationship but also, importantly, an opportunity to take a well-deserved cue from the Chinese to delineate what should be Indian foreign policy’s pragmatic face.

The visit marked a sustained effort to institutionalise high-level visits and sustain the momentum of dialogue, which received a boost after former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit in 2003. The 2003 visit had concluded on a high note of the Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation, which marked India’s tacit recognition of Tibet as a part of China, in lieu of China’s recognition of Sikkim. Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit in 2005 led to an agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the settlement of the boundary question, and in 2006, President Hu Jintao’s visit reaffirmed the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership.

The bilateral visit comes after the conclusion of the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation between India and China in 2006 which culminated in the first ever joint military exercise “Hand in Hand” held in Kunming, Yunnan province, in December 2007. This also comes on the heels of the 11 rounds of discussions between the Special Representatives on the unresolved border issue and the Third Round of Strategic Dialogue held in Beijing in 2007.

The visit took place in the backdrop of growing trade between the two. Sino-Indian trade which was $2.1 billion in 2000 has grown dramatically. It touched a high of $35 billion in 2007, up 54 per cent compared to 2006, making China India’s second largest trading partner. The target of $40 billion by 2010 set out in 2006 will be realised earlier.

On this visit, the target is to be further pushed to $60 billion a year. Border trade between India and China has resumed at the Nathu La pass after a hiatus of 44 years in 2006, facilitating the export of 15 listed Chinese goods and 29 Indian goods. However, trade is uninspiring at a meagre $1 billion.

This visit will also take forward the recommendations of the Joint Study Group (Feasibility Study) on the Regional Trading Arrangement (RTA) and measures to facilitate the same. While there has been progress on bilateral trade, India’s growing trade deficit, estimated at $9 billion in 2007, as well as the composition of the trade of low-value primary goods (such as iron ore) is worrisome. India is the 10th largest export destination for China.

The visit comes on the heels of new developments in the border region. Border negotiations continue to be tricky and remain under wraps. During the 11th round of talks between the Special Representatives, both sides agreed to form a Joint Working Group on the framework to resolve the issue.

The dispute in the Western Sector (WS, that is, Aksai Chin) and Eastern Sector (ES, Tawang) remains intractable with 14 areas under dispute (eight in the WS and six in the ES). There is no dispute in the Middle Sector. The dispute in the Western Sector has become complicated with the transfer of Shaksgam Valley (in PoK) by Pakistan to China. China does not recognise the Mcmahon line in the north-east and incursions along the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) have been reported in Arunachal Pradesh, an area which China covertly claims as South Tibet. Indian diplomatic channels have indicated China’s intransigence. China, on the other hand, alleges intrusions by India in the Western Sector.

China’s entente cordiale by way of defence or military arrangements with India’s neighbours — “encirclement” — has been cause for concern. China has upgraded or stimulated communication channels with India’s neighbours. The China-Nepal bus service started on the 736 km Kodari Highway since 2005; China also proposes to build four more road routes through Kunjerab Pass (PoK) to Pakistan doubling the existing network to eight. China and Pakistan also signed an MoU to upgrade the Karakoram Highway (KKH) in 2006. Pakistan has allowed China clout at Gwadar deep sea port at the mouth of Persian Gulf, an important Sea Line of Communication (SLOC). This will reportedly overhaul China’s maritime security, and enable an “energy channel” by giving it a strategic foothold in the gateway to West Asia. Plans are on the anvil to build a rail along the KKH, linking Western China to Pakistan.

China’s $3.1 billion Qinghai-Tibet Rail, which commenced operations in 2006, is also likely to have implications on Indian security. The 1,956 km rail line connects Xining with Golmud (both in Qinghai province) to Lhasa (TAR, Tibetan Autonomous Region). This line is to be further extended by 254 km at an estimated cost of $1.2 billion. The rail line will now extend to Shigatse, TAR’s second biggest city, during the ongoing 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010) and then onwards to Nepal. This would make India more accessible to China’s Chengdu Military Region (MR) and Lanzhou MR manned by the People’s Liberation Army.

There are allegations that tunnels built ostensibly for the railway may be used as missile bases. There are also unconfirmed reports that China is working on a military installation near Shiquanhe, Ngari prefecture, TAR. This backdrop explains India’s current initiative to step up infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh — seven roadways in the Indian state have been mapped out and 20 more planned in the border areas in the near future — which the Prime Minister will inaugurate later this month.

While the PM’s visit is a step forward, it is necessary, in the words of a famous sinologist, to see “China by daylight”, that is, to understand China in all its complexities and reign in both unbridled enthusiasm and cynicism about China.

Given the nature of the above developments, rabble-rousing about the “China threat” provides no solutions; the Chinese have not prevented India from setting its house in order, such as developing relations with peripheral states or upgrading infrastructure in border areas. Both vacillate between the promise of genuine friendship and the inextricable cloud of history. It is necessary to close the “knowledge gap” between the two. Geo-strategic compulsions and globalisation have underlined that there are no permanent friends or enemies.

And last but not the least, the visit entails lessons for India from China. From Mao to Market, leadership in China has maintained a constant goal, a long-term vision of fuqiang (fu, rich; qiang, strong) — of making the country rich and strong. China’s infrastructure has been one of the keys to becoming a manufacturing superpower.

What is admirable is China’s remarkable foresight. Defence preparedness, defence cooperation arrangements with neighbouring countries, developing relations around its periphery, progressive multi-dimensional relations with countries as disparate as United States, Congo and Myanmar, to name a few, proactive presence in regional and global fora, and a commitment to the goal of “Development is the fundamental principle” have propelled China’s resurgence in Asia and the world. The lesson for India is to take the cue.